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bstract
This paper develops a DSGE model with investment and capital accumulation build along demand-driven explanations of the Great
ecession. Specifically, following Farmer (2013), I set forth a search framework in which households decide about consumption
hile firms decide about recruiting effort as well as investment. This setting closed with market clearing in good and asset markets
as one less equation than unknowns. As a consequence, in order to solve such an indeterminacy, I assume that investment is driven
y self-fulfilling expectations about the adjustment cost of capital. Consistently with the view of business cycles pushed by stock
rice fluctuations, this model has the potential to provide a more comprehensive rationale for the consumption–investment patterns
bserved during the years of the crisis.
 2015 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
eserved.
EL classiﬁcation: E24; E32; E52; J64
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esumo
O artigo apresenta um modelo DSGE com investimento e acumulac¸ão de capital para explicar a Grande Recessão pelo lado da
emanda. Seguimos Farmer (2013) propondo uma estrutura de search no qual familias decidem o quanto consumir e firmas investem
 recrutam mão de obra. Nesse arcabouc¸o há uma equac¸ão a menos do que incógnitas. De maneira a resolver essa indeterminac¸ão
upomos que o investimento tem expectativas auto-realizáveis sobre o custo de ajustamento do capital. Consistente com a visão
e que os ciclos de negócios são influenciados pelas flutuac¸ões dos prec¸os de ac¸ões, esse modelo tem o potencial de prover uma
ationale mais compreensiva para os padrões de consumo-investimento observados durante os anos de crise.
 2015 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
eserved.
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Table 1
US data (1950–2012), quantity indexes.
 ln(Y)  ln(C)  ln(I)  ln(U)
Standard deviation 0.945 0.842 4.450 6.827
Autocorrelation 0.388 0.088 0.199 0.616
Correlation matrix  ln(Y) 1 0.617 0.782 −0.707
 ln(C) – 1 0.257 -0.473
 ln(I) – – 1 −0.558
 ln(U) – – – 11.  Introduction
According to a widespread view, the Great Recession of 2007–2008 can be thought as the upshot of a dramatic loss
of confidence triggered by the burst of a financial bubble that abruptly reduced house and stock prices (cf. Hurd and
Rohwedder, 2010; Bell and Blanchflower, 2011; Christelis et al., 2011). A prominent backer of this view is Farmer
(2012a,b, 2013, 2015), who depicts the finance-induced recession as a self-fulfilling reduction of households’ financial
wealth value that led to a sudden consumption contraction that, in turn, drove GDP (unemployment) downwards
(upwards).
Farmer’s (2012a,b, 2013) theoretical framework reformulates into a Walrasian setting two important ideas from
Keynes’s (1936) General  Theory. The first is that the economy can be consistent with a continuum of steady-state
unemployment equilibria, while the second is that beliefs of asset market participants might have an independent
influence on the economic activity by selecting a perfect-foresight equilibrium in which private consumption, according
to its dominant weight in GDP quotas, is assumed to be the crucial component of aggregate demand.
This theoretical proposal, sometimes referred as new ‘Farmerian’ economics, provides new interesting insights
on business cycles fluctuations and gives the chance to dig out into the Keynesian view according to which market
confidence is essential in determining realized macroeconomic outcomes.1 However, it is well known that in the General
Theory the component of private expenditure mainly driven by market psychology instead of economy’s fundamentals
is not consumption but corporate investment; indeed, Keynes (1936) coined the term ‘animal spirits’ just to describe
the non-fundamental based behaviour of entrepreneurs regarding investment spending. Moreover, according to Keynes
(1936), private investment – via the multiplier effect – was the main driver of business cycles (cf. Smith and Zoega,
2009).
As far as US data are concerned, the importance of investment in explaining macroeconomic fluctuations is still
hard to neglect. For instance, Table 1 collects the volatility, the persistence and the correlation matrix of GDP (Y),
consumption (C), private investment (I) and unemployment (U) over the last sixty years on a quarterly basis.2 The
figures show that the correlation of investment both to GDP and unemployment – in absolute value – is slightly higher
than the one of consumption. Moreover, among the components of private aggregate demand, investment appears as
the more volatile variable so, at least in principle, the more prone to mirror sudden switches in market confidence.
Additional intriguing elements about investment behaviour can also be derived from the inspection of recent data.
Specifically, the two panels of Fig. 1 draws the paths of the real values of consumption (left scale) and investment
(right scale) both in levels and as percentage of GDP starting from the beginning of the century. The diagram above
(a) shows that the wave of pessimism triggered by the finance-induced recession of 2008–2009 had a strong impact on
the two components of private aggregate spending. However, while consumption already recovered its pre-crisis level
at the end of 2010, investment, as pointed out by Lavander and Parent (2012-2013), is still below its 2007 magnitude.3
1 An extensive review of the new Farmerian approach is given by Guerrazzi (2012).
2 Data on GDP, consumption and investments are retrieved form the seasonally adjusted quantity indexes provided by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (Index Numbers, 2009 = 100). See www.bea.gov. Moreover, data on unemployment are retrieved from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. See
www.bls.gov.
3 Along these lines, Zoega (2010) points out the simultaneous deficiency of employment and investment that characterized the latest financial
crisis.
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n addition, the diagram below (b) shows that – in relative terms – the wealth effect on consumption triggered by the
reat Recession is almost negligible while the depressing effect on investment is more serious and quite persistent.
In this paper, taking into account the macroeconomic patterns sketched above, I introduce productive investment and
apital accumulation in the one-sector framework developed by Farmer (2013). To the best of my knowledge, this is
he first new Farmerian contribution in which both consumption and investment are addressed within an inter-temporal
ptimization framework.4 Specifically, I build a demand-driven search DSGE model in which households put forward
n optimal trajectory for consumption while, at the same time, consumer-owned firms decide about optimal recruiting
ffort as well as an optimal trajectory for investment along the lines of the frameworks set forth by Jorgerson (1963),
bel and Blanchard (1983) and Chirinko (1993).
Given the presence of search frictions, the model economy closed with market clearing in asset and good markets
s characterized by one more unknown than equations so that both its dynamics and its stationary solution remain
ndeterminate. In my own proposal, such an indeterminacy is solved by assuming that entrepreneurs form self-fulfilling
xpectations about the adjustment cost of capital. This variable is assumed to convey the Keynesian state of long-term
4 Seminal attempts to introduce investment and capital accumulation in the new Farmerian model are given by Guerrazzi and Gelain (2015),
uerrazzi (2011, 2012), Gelain and Guerrazzi (2010) and Plotnikov (2014).
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expectations that selects equilibrium unemployment period by period by delivering market allocations that are not
necessary efficient outcomes.
From a theoretical point of view, my model implies that whenever entrepreneurs perceive capital adjustments as
more (less) expensive, the model economy experiences a sudden decrease (increase) of investment flows. Thereafter,
lower (higher) investment depresses (boosts) capital accumulation by reducing (increasing) the wealth of households.
This in turn triggers a negative (positive) wealth effect that leads to a decrease (increase) in private consumption.
On the whole, lower (higher) investment and lower (higher) consumption push unemployment upwards (down-
wards). As a consequence, this setting seems to have the potential to provide a more comprehensive rationale of
the consumption–investment patterns observed during the Great Recession.
In addition, from a quantitative perspective, I show that the long-run behaviour of the model economy mirrors the
observed co-movements of GDP, consumption and investment. Moreover, I give robust evidence that the transmission
mechanism of confidence shocks implied by this theoretical framework appears quite consistent with business cycles
driven by self-fulfilling asset price fluctuations.
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 develops the social planner problem. Section 3 offers a decentralized
version. Section 4 analyses some quantitative implications of the model. Finally, Section 5 concludes by giving some
policy implications.
2.  Social  planner  problem
Following Farmer (2013), I begin by introducing the problem of a benevolent social planner whose goal is the
maximization of the individual welfare of a representative household endowed with certain preferences. Such a social
planner is constrained by two distinct technologies: the former describes how labour and capital combine themselves
in order to produce output, the latter conveys the way in which unemployed workers can be recruited in the productive
side of the economy.
In what follows, I provide a description of household preferences and binding technologies. Moreover, I solve the
social planner problem and I give its stationary solution.
2.1.  Household  preferences  and  labour  market  participation
I will assume that the model economy is populated by a continuum of identical households endowed with logarithmic
preferences that do not yield utility (disutility) from leisure (work).5 As a consequence, the present value of households
discounted utility can be written as
E0
[+∞∑
t=0
βt log(Ct)
]
0 <  β  <  1 (1)
where E[·] is the expectation operator, β  is the discount factor and Ct is current real consumption.
The dimension of the representative household is normalized to one. Moreover, in each period, its members can be
alternatively employed or unemployed. Therefore, denoting employed household members by Lt, it follows that the
unemployment rate can be conveyed as
Ut =  1 −  Lt (2)
2.2.  Production  technology  and  capital  accumulation
Output in this model economy is produced by means of a Cobb–Douglas technology by combining capital and
labour in a stochastic manner. As a consequence,
Yt =  StKαt X1−αt 0 <  α  <  1 (3)
5 In an unpublished appendix, Farmer shows that controlling for labour supply does not significantly alter the results achieved in this simplest
context. See www.rogerfarmer.com.
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here Yt is the level of production, St is a supply shock, Kt is the stock of capital, α (1 −  α) is the elasticity of output
ith respect to capital (labour) and Xt is the amount of labour used in production.
Consistently with Farmer (2013), I assume that employed workers can be alternatively allocated in recruiting or
roduction activities. Therefore,
Lt =  Xt +  Vt (4)
here Vt is the share of employed workers allocated to recruiting.
Moreover, in contrast to Farmer (2013), the amount of output which is not consumed is assumed to boost capital
ccumulation. Therefore, the stock of capital evolves according to the usual dynamic law. Hence,
Kt+1 =  Yt −  Ct +  (1 −  δ)Kt 0 <  δ  <  1 (5)
here δ  is the capital depreciation rate.
.3.  Search  technology  and  employment  dynamics
Symmetrically with production, the technology that moves unemployed workers from home to work is a stochastic
obb–Douglas combination between recruiters and jobless workers. This assumption leads to the following employ-
ent evolution law:
Lt+1 =  BtV θt (1 −  Lt)1−θ +  (1 −  σ)Lt 0 <  θ  <  1,  0 <  σ <  1 (6)
here Bt is a matching shock, θ  (1 −  θ) is the elasticity of matching with respect to recruiters (unemployment) and σ
s the exogenous job destruction rate.6
.4.  Solution  of  the  social  planner  problem
Taking into account the building blocks described above, the social planner problem can be written as
max
{Ct,Vt,Kt+1,Lt+1}+∞t=0
E0
[+∞∑
t=0
βt log(Ct)
]
s. to
Kt+1 =  StKαt (Lt −  Vt)1−α −  Ct +  (1 −  δ)Kt
Lt+1 =  BtV θt (1 −  Lt)1−θ +  (1 −  σ)Lt
K0 =  K,  L0 =  L
(7)
here K  and L  are, respectively, the initial conditions for capital and employment.
The first-order conditions (FOCs) for the problem in (7) are the following:
1
Ct
=  βEt
[
αSt+1α−1t+1 +  1 −  δ
Ct+1
]
(8)
St
α
t 	
1−θ
t
θBtCt
=  βEt
[
St+1αt+1
Ct+1
(
1 + (1 −  σ)	
1−θ
t+1 −  (1 −  θ)Bt+1	t+1
θBt+1
)]
(9)
Kt+1 =  Stαt (Lt −  Vt) −  Ct +  (1 −  δ)Kt (10)
Lt+1 =  Bt	θt (1 −  Lt) +  (1 −  σ)Lt (11)lim
t→+∞β
tλtKt =  0 (12)
6 In the context of the standard search and matching model à la Pissarides (2000), an equivalent stochastic dynamics for (un)employment is set
orth by Andolfatto (1996).
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lim
t→+∞β
tμtLt =  0 (13)
where t ≡  Kt(Lt −  Vt)−1, 	t ≡  Vt(1 −  Lt)−1 and {λt}+∞t=0 ({μt}+∞t=0 ) is the sequence of Lagrange multipliers on the
capital accumulation constraint (employment evolution law).7
The interpretation of the FOCs of the social planner problem is straightforward. Eqs. (8) and (9) are the Euler
equations for the two control variables, namely, consumption and recruiters. Moreover, Eqs. (10) and (11) reproduce
the dynamics of the two state variables. Furthermore, (12) and (13) are the required transversality conditions.
The solution of the social planner’s problem is quite relevant; indeed, the implied trajectories for Yt and Ut define,
respectively, the new Farmerian counterparts of the potential output and the natural rate of unemployment retrieved
from new Keynesian DSGE models (e.g. Gali, 2008).
2.5.  Steady-state  of  the  social  planner  problem
The social planner problem is a concave maximization problem constrained by two convex technology constraints.
As a consequence, (7) has a unique meaningful saddle-path stationary solution towards which all the endogenous
variables asymptotically have to converge in order to verify the transversality conditions in Eqs. (12) and (13) (cf.
Cass, 1966).
Adopting the notational convention such that variables without time indexes denote steady-state values, the stationary
solution of the social planner problem is defined by the following proposition:
Proposition 1.  The  employment  steady-state  solution  of  the  social  planner  problem  is  given  by
L  = B	̂
θ
σ  +  B	̂θ (14)
where 	̂ is  deﬁned  by  the  positive  root  of  the  following  non-linear  hyperbolic  expression:
	B(1 −  θ)β  +  	1−θ(1 −  β(1 −  σ)) −  Bθβ  =  0 (15)
Thereafter,  the  steady-state  levels  of  the  other  endogenous  variables  can  be  retrieved  from
V  =
(
σL
B(1 −  L)1−θ
)(1/θ)
K  =
(
αβS
1 −  β(1 −  δ)
)(1/1−α)
(L  −  V  )
C =  S
(
αβS
1 −  β(1 −  δ)
)(α/1−α)
(L  −  V  ) −  δK
(16)
The proof is given in Appendix.
Proposition 1 has two important implications. First, equilibrium (un)employment is not affected by technology
shocks. As a consequence, the steady-state value of the wandering natural rate of unemployment implied by the
solution of the social planner problem is driven by matching shocks only and it is not affected by technology trends
(cf. Layard et al., 1991). Moreover, equilibrium (un)employment spills over into the other endogenous variables but
not the other way round; indeed, equilibrium (un)employment is completely determined by the discount rate and the
parameters underlying employment dynamics.8 In Section 4, this result will be quite useful for calibrating the market
version of the model.
7 It is worth noting that t and 	t convey, respectively, a measure of the capital–labour ratio and a measure of labour market tightness.
8 A by-product of this feature is that whenever θ = 0.5, equilibrium (un)employment collapses to the value derived by Farmer (2013).
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.  A  decentralized  version
In this section, drawing on the theoretical works on investment by Jorgerson (1963), Abel and Blanchard (1983) and
hirinko (1993), I extend the framework developed by Farmer (2013) by taking into account that productive firms have
o decide about the optimal amount of recruiters as well as the optimal trajectory of investment. As I will show below,
his setting closed with market-clearing in asset and good markets displays steady-state and dynamics indeterminacy
ecause it has one less equation than unknowns.9
.1.  Households
In the decentralized economy households maximize their discounted flow of utility under a wealth-accumulation
ath. Moreover, consistently with the matching mechanism described in the previous section, they will set consumption
lso taking into account that, in each period, a market-determined share of their unemployed members will find a job
hile a fixed share of their employed members will loose its position. As a consequence, the representative household
s assumed to solve the following problem:
max
{Ct,At+1}+∞t=0
E0
[+∞∑
t=0
βt log(Ct)
]
s. to
At+1 =  (1 +  rt)At +  wtLt −  Ct
Lt+1 = q˜t(1 −  Lt) +  (1 −  σ)Lt
A0 =  A, L0 =  L
(17)
here Ct is the real value of consumption expenditure, At is the current value of household’s wealth, rt is the real
nterest rate, wt is the real wage, q˜t is the endogenous probability to find a job and A  is the initial level of wealth.
The FOCs for the household problem can be written as
1
Ct
=  βEt
[
1 +  rt+1
Ct+1
]
(18)
At+1 =  (1 +  rt)At +  wtLt −  Ct (19)
lim
t→+∞β
tϕtAt =  0 (20)
here {ϕt}+∞t=0 is the sequence of Lagrange multipliers on the wealth accumulation constraint.
Eq. (18) is the Euler equation for consumption. Moreover, Eq. (19) reproduces the dynamics of state variables.
urthermore, (20) is the required transversality condition.
Since employment dynamics enters the problem of the household as an exogenous shock and production technology
s stochastic, I need to assume that there exists a complete set of Arrow securities indexed for each possible realization
f the states of the world. Under those circumstances, the Euler equation in (18) implies that payments streams will be
iscounted period by period with the following price kernel:
Qt =  β
(
Ct
Ct+1
)
(21)Taking into account that households are assumed to be the owners of firms, the expression in Eq. (21) will be
mplemented below to evaluate the present value of expected cash-flows generated by the production activity.
9 Such an indeterminacy does not arise in the general equilibrium model by Abel and Blanchard (1983) because they implicitly assume that the
abour market always clear. By contrast, in the present framework, search frictions usually prevent this to happen.
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3.2.  Firms
Productive firms are assumed to set recruiters and investment by maximizing their discounted cash-flows under the
capital accumulation constraint. Moreover, symmetrically with households, they will take into account that in each
period recruiters can hire a market-determined share of workers while a fixed share of employees quits for exogenous
redundancy. Therefore, the problem of the representative firm can be written as
max
{Vt,It ,Kt+1,Lt+1}+∞t=0
E0
[+∞∑
t=0
Qtt(StKαt (Lt −  Vt)1−α −  (1 +  pI,t)It −  wtLt)
]
s. to
Kt+1 =  It +  (1 −  δ)Kt
Lt+1 =  qtVt +  (1 −  σ)Lt
K0 =  K,  L0 =  L
(22)
where (1 + pI,t) is the gross cost of investment, It is real investment and qt is the endogenous hiring effectiveness of
each corporate recruiter.
Depending on the degree of aggregation, the factor that gives a value to investment expenditure can be interpreted
in different ways. On the one hand, according to the seminal work by Jorgerson (1963) on investment at the plant
level, 1 + pI,t can be thought as an exogenously given price of capital goods divided by the GDP deflator. However, in
a frictionless one-good economy, pI,t should be always equal to 0 (cf. Wang and Wen, 2012). On the other hand, in the
spirit of the macroeconomic contribution by Abel and Blanchard (1983), pI,t can be interpreted as a time-dependent
adjustment cost conveyed in real terms that the firm has to pay in order to modify the level of its capital stock.
In this paper, I plainly adhere to the macroeconomic perspective. However, I do not follow the literature on the
installation costs of new capital equipment which usually assumes that pI,t is determined by fundamentals such as
the flow of investment, the stock of capital and technology shocks (e.g. Chirinko, 1993). On the contrary, I take the
adjustment cost of capital as the outcome of self-fulfilling beliefs. This modelling strategy is motivated by the fact that,
everything else being equal, the higher (lower) the expected values of pI,t, the lower (higher) the expected cash-flows
of the firm. As a consequence, sudden changes in the expectations about pI,t have the potential to convey sharp shifts
in expected corporate yields by influencing the willingness to invest of productive firms. Moreover, the introduction
of an adjustment cost of capital unrelated to the fundamentals of the economy allows the decentralized version of the
model to behave differently from the centralized version so that market allocations do not necessarily coincide with
efficient outcomes.
The FOCs of the firm problem are the following:
pI,t =  Et
[
Qt(αSt+1α−1t+1 +  (1 +  pI,t+1)(1 −  δ))
]
−  1 (23)
(1 −  α) Stαt
qt
=  Et
[
Qt
(
(1 −  α) St+1αt+1
(
1 + 1 −  σ
qt+1
)
−  wt+1
)]
(24)
Kt+1 =  It +  (1 −  δ)Kt (25)
Lt+1 =  qtVt +  (1 −  σ)Lt (26)
lim
t→+∞Q
t
tωtKt =  0 (27)
lim
t→+∞Q
t
tξtLt =  0 (28)
+∞ +∞where {ωt}t=0 ({ξt}t=0 ) is the sequence of Lagrange multipliers on the capital accumulation constraint (employment
evolution law).
Eqs. (23) and (24) are Euler equations, respectively, for investment and recruiters. Moreover, Eqs. (24) and (25)
reproduces the dynamics of state variables. Furthermore, (26) and (27) are the transversality conditions.
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.3.  Search  probabilities
The probability to find a job as well as the recruiting effectiveness of corporate recruiters are both determined by
ssuming that in a symmetric equilibrium the employment evolution laws that affect the problems of households and
rms describe the same employment path tracked by the employment dynamics that bind the social planner problem.
s a consequence, in each period, the probability to find a job is given by
q˜t =  Bt	θt (29)
Moreover, in a similar manner, the recruiting effectiveness of corporate recruiters can be conveyed as
qt =  Bt	θ−1t (30)
The expressions in Eqs. (29) and (30) mirror the traditional trading externalities that characterize a textbook search
nd matching economy; indeed, q˜t (qt) is an increasing (decreasing) function of the labour market tightness indicator
cf. Pissarides, 2000).
.4.  Characterizing  equilibria
Leaving out supply and matching shocks that, by definition, are exogenous factors, the decentralized model is called
n to determine period by period the following set of twelve endogenous variables:{
Ct, At,  Lt,  Vt,  It,  Kt,  Qt, q˜t, qt,  rt, wt, pI,t
} (31)
Straightforward algebra suggests that determinacy of the model requires the same number of equations. First, two
f them immediately derive from the definitions of search probabilities, i.e., Eqs. (29) and (30). Moreover, the FOCs of
ouseholds and firms problems provide additional seven forward- and backward-looking inter-temporal relationships.
n details, the Euler equation for consumption, i.e., Eq. (18), the price kernel, i.e., Eq. (21), the wealth accumulation
ath, i.e., Eq. (19), the Euler equation for investment, i.e., Eq. (23), the Euler equation for recruiters, i.e., Eq. (24), the
apital evolution law, i.e., Eq. (25), and an employment dynamic pattern consistent with the already mentioned search
robability, i.e., Eq. (11).
To close the model three more equations are called in. On an intra-temporal basis, two important relationships come
rom the market-clearing conditions on asset and good markets, respectively,
At =  Kt (32)
nd
Ct +  (1 +  pI,t)It =  Stαt (Lt −  Vt) (33)
Eq. (32) states that value of households’ wealth has to be equal to the value of firms’ capital. Moreover, according
o the national account identity, Eq. (33) conveys that the sum of consumption and investment expenditures must be
qual to produced output.
Finally, similarly to Farmer (2013), the balance between the number of equations and the number of unknowns
s reached by assuming that entrepreneurs form self-fulfilling expectations about the adjustment cost of capital. As a
onsequence,
Et
[
pI,t+1
] =  xt (34)
here xt is a belief-function which is assumed to map observations of current and past investment costs to expectations
bout future costs.
It is worth noting that, in each period of time – given the expectation of pI – all the other endogenous variable are
etermined in order to make such an expectation self-validating. In other words, Eq. (34) resolves the indeterminacy
f the model economy by selecting a perfect-foresight path in which expectations about the adjustment cost of capital
re self-fulfilling. In practice, there is a variety of ways xt could be specified. For instance, Farmer (2012b) models
eliefs by resorting to a martingale. Moreover, Farmer (2013) assumes that xt takes the form of a conventional adaptive
xpectation equation. Since in the next section I will focus only on steady-state equilibria, I will not provide any specific
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functional form for xt. Taking into account that the way in which agents form expectation may change over time, I
leave the evolution of beliefs as well the short-run dynamics of the model economy to further developments.10
3.5.  Steady-state  of  the  decentralized  model
In steady-state, households’ Euler equation for consumption implies that the equilibrium real interest rate is given
by
r  = 1 −  β
β
(35)
As far as the result in Eq. (35) is concerned, the stationary solution of the other endogenous variables can be retrieved
from the following proposition:
Proposition  2.  Deﬁne  the  constants  0, 1 and  2 as  follows:
0 ≡ 1 −  β(1 −  δ(1 +  α))
α(1 −  β)
1 ≡ (1 −  α)(1 −  β(1 −  δ))
α(1 −  β)
2 ≡ σ
1 −  θ
θ (1 −  β(1 −  σ))
B
1
θ β
(36)
For  each  value  of  pI ∈  (−1, (0 −  1)−1 −  1),  the  (positive)  employment  steady-state  solution  of  the  decentralized
version of  the  model  is  given  by  the  root  of  the  following  hyperbolic  equation:
1
1 +  pI −  0 +  1
1 −  2
(
L
1−L
) 1−θ
θ
1 − ( σ
B
) 1
θ
(
L
1−L
) 1−θ
θ
=  0 (37)
Thereafter,  the  steady-state  levels  of  the  other  endogenous  variables  can  be  obtained  from  the  following  equations:
V  =
(
σL
B(1 −  L)1−θ
)1
θ
K =  A  =
(
αβS
(1 +  pI ) (1 −  β (1 −  δ))
) 1
1 −  α (L  −  V )
I =  δK
w  = (1 −  α) S
(
K
L  −  V
)α⎛⎜⎝1 − ( L1 −  L
)1 −  θ
θ
2
⎞⎟⎠
C =  Kr  +  wL
Q =  β
(38)
In  addition,  ,  	, q˜ and  q  can  be  derived  from  their  respective  deﬁnitions.The proof is given in Appendix.
10 A general theory of expectations is beyond the scope of the present contribution.
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Proposition 2 suggests three interesting conclusions. First, in the decentralized model the equilibrium values of the
elief function and the matching shock univocally select equilibrium (un)employment by solving the indeterminacy
entioned above. As a consequence, symmetrically with the employment steady-state solution of the social planner
roblem, supply shocks do not affect the equilibrium unemployment rate of the decentralized economy. Second,
here exists an upper bound for the eligible equilibrium value of the cost of investment that pushes equilibrium
mployment towards zero. Furthermore, whenever the equilibrium adjustment cost of capital becomes a subsidy that
xactly counterbalances its replacement cost, so that (1 + pI)−1 tends to infinity, the employment steady-state solution
f the decentralized model tends to the full employment allocation; indeed, the hyperbolic expression on RHS of (37)
ends to infinity if and only if L  approaches one.11 The determination of equilibrium employment is illustrated in Fig. 2.
In this theoretical framework, whenever entrepreneurs perceive capital adjustments as more (less) expensive, there
re two subsequent effects on the private components of aggregate demand. First, there is a sudden decrease (increase)
f the investment flow. As a consequence, this setting provides a straightforward formalization for how the credit
runch, i.e., the dramatic worsening of firm access to bank credit experienced over the financial crisis, translated into a
all in firms’ spending on additional physical capital (cf. Haltenhof et al., 2014). Moreover, lower (higher) investment
epresses (boosts) capital accumulation by reducing (rising) the wealth of households. Similarly to Farmer (2013), this
n turn triggers a negative (positive) wealth effect that leads to a decrease (increase) in private consumption. On the
hole, as shown in Fig. 2, lower (higher) investment and lower (higher) consumption push unemployment upwards
downwards).
All in all, the arguments developed above reveal that this model seems to have the potential to provide a more com-
rehensive rationale of the consumption–investment patterns observed during the Great Recession without neglecting
apital accumulation.
.  Quantitative  implications  of  the  model
In this section I explore some quantitative implications of the theoretical framework developed in Sections 2 and
. First, I provide a suitable model calibration. Moreover, I analyse the long-run behaviour of the model economy by
eriving the properties of steady-state equilibria. In addition, I discuss the reliance of different business cycle drivers.
.1.  Calibration
The model is calibrated in order to be consistent with US quarterly figures. Specifically, the capital share, the
iscount factor and the depreciation rate of capital are set at the same values chosen by Kydland and Prescott (1982) in
heir real business cycle contribution. Moreover, the parameters of the employment evolution law are fixed according
o the JOLT-based estimations retrieved by Shimer (2005). In addition, the equilibrium value of productivity shocks
s normalized to one while the corresponding figure for matching shocks is set in order to convey a social optimal
11 In this case households would be allowed to consume all the produced output.
354 M. Guerrazzi / EconomiA 16 (2015) 343–358
Table 2
Calibration.
Parameter Symbol Value
Capital share α 0.360
Discount factor β 0.999
Capital depreciation δ 0.025
Matching elasticity θ 0.280
Job destruction rate σ 0.100
Productivity shock S 1.000
Matching shock B 2.155
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Fig. 3. Steady-state relationships.
unemployment rate equal to the historical unemployment rate implied by the data reported in Table 1, i.e., a point value
of 5.84%.12 The whole set of parameter values is collected in Table 2.
4.2.  Properties  of  steady-state  equilibria
The results in Proposition 2 recall that for each eligible value of pI there exists a unique meaningful steady-state level
of (un)employment. Thereafter, given the solution for L, the steady-state values of all the other endogenous variables
can be easily derived. Taking into account the parametrization in Table 2, Fig. 3 tracks the steady-state relationships of
GDP, consumption, investment and its cost over the range of employment rates observed over the last sixty years (dotted
lines represent planning optimum).13 Those relationships can be taken as the theoretical cointegrating relationships
existing among the different variables.
All over the past sixty years, the US unemployment rate ranged from a minimum value of 2.57%, reached in the
second quarter of 1953, to a maximum value of 10.66% achieved in the forth quarter of 1982. The diagrams in Fig. 3
reveal that along the range of observed unemployment the cyclical co-movements of the theoretical co-movement of
GDP, consumption and investment is fairly consistent with the figures of the correlation matrix in Table 1; indeed,
counter-cyclical patterns appear only when unemployment falls below 3%, a figure lower than the planning optimum
that is not so recurrent in actual data.
12 The implicit hypothesis for this numerical choice is that all over the concerned period, on average, actual unemployment fluctuated around the
value that would have been chosen by the social planner whose behaviour is described in Section 2.
13 The MATLAB code to derive the panels of Fig. 3 is available from the author.
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.3.  What  is  the  driving  force  of  business  cycles?
Farmer (2012a,b, 2013, 2015) and the other backers of the finance-induced recession mentioned in Section 1
onvincingly argue that the stock market crash of 2008 triggered the subsequent macroeconomic downturn. On a
loser inspection, the transmission mechanism of beliefs shocks implied by the model outlined in Section 3 can easily
upport this view; indeed, circumstantial evidence analyzed, inter alia, by Fama (1981) and Barro (1990) shows that
here is a quite strong positive relation between stock market prices and corporate investment. Obviously, this relation
uggests that increases (decreases) in asset market values may lead entrepreneurs to perceive capital adjustment as less
more) costly in a self-fulfilling manner. This, on turn, will increase (decrease) their willingness to hire.14
On an empirical perspective, this conjecture is corroborated by the negative relation observed between the relative
rice of investment – that I take as a proxy for the gross cost of investment – and the deflated S&P500 index over the
ast sixty years depicted in Fig. 4.15
The diagram in Fig. 4 shows that asset prices and the relative price of investment are linked by a clear-cut negative
elation all over the period under examination; indeed, the linear regression line has a slope of −3.56 with a standard
rror of 1.11. As a consequence, given the strength of such a relation, the model developed in Section 3 appears
onsistent with business cycles driven by self-fulfilling asset price movements.16 In this light, pI can be considered as
he signal of what Keynes (1936) called the inducement to invest, i.e., the incentive to invest on new projects triggered
hen companies’ shares are quoted very high.
.  Concluding  remarks
In this paper I introduce investment and capital accumulation in the theoretical setting developed by Farmer (2013).
pecifically, I build a demand-driven search economy in which households decide their optimal trajectory for con-
umption while, at the same time, consumer-owned firms decide about optimal recruiting effort as well as the optimal
rajectory for productive investment (cf. Jorgerson, 1963; Abel and Blanchard, 1983 and Chirinko, 1993).
14 A similar relation among asset prices, investment and employment have been found by Zoega (2009) in many OECD countries.
15 On the one hand, the relative price of investment is build by dividing the price index of gross private domestic investment by the GDP deflator
uch as provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. On the other hand, the S&P500 index is retrieved by removing seasonal patterns and deflating
he figures provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis. See www.research.stlouisfed.org.
16 Taking the same variables in levels, such a negative relation is even stronger (slope: −32.90; standard error: 0.90). Details are available from
he author.
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Given the presence of search frictions, closing the model with market clearing in the assets and goods markets
leads to a non-linear system in which there is one more unknown than equations. In the present proposal, such an
indeterminacy is solved by assuming that entrepreneurs form self-fulfilling expectations about the adjustment cost of
capital.
In this setting, I show that whenever entrepreneurs perceive capital adjustments as more (less) expensive, the
model economy experiences a sudden decrease (increase) of the investment flow. Thereafter, lower (higher) investment
depresses (boosts) capital accumulation by reducing (rising) the wealth of households. This on turn triggers a negative
(positive) wealth effect that leads to a decrease (increase) in private consumption. On the whole, lower (higher)
investment and lower (higher) consumption push employment downwards (upwards). As a consequence, this framework
seems to have the potential to provide a more comprehensive explanation of the consumption-investment patterns
observed during the Great Recession.
From a quantitative point of view, I show that long run behaviour of the model economy is consistent with the observed
co-movements of GDP, consumption and investment. Moreover, I provide evidence that the transmission mechanism
of belief shocks implied by the present theoretical framework can mirror business cycles driven by self-fulfilling asset
price fluctuations.
What are the suggested economic policies or the regulatory framework that according to the present analysis would
be more effective in remedying and preventing crises? Obviously, a fiscal stimulus that sustains aggregate demand
would counterbalance the employment effects triggered by a financial turmoil. However, the theoretical model and the
empirical evidence presented in this paper suggest that an intervention on the asset market aimed at preventing sudden
crashes may be able to produce the same employment effects as well as a stabilization of investment flows. For instance,
when there is a loss of confidence that drives asset prices downwards, the central bank could buy shares on the asset
market by selling back public securities. Since the return on public securities is guaranteed by the government through
the tax system, this intervention should stop the deflation in the asset market by preventing the fall of investment. In the
long run, such an intervention of qualitative easing may be more effective than fiscal expansionary policies in boosting
economic growth.
Appendix  A.
In what follows, I provide the formal proofs for Propositions 1 and 2.
Proof  of  Proposition  1
In steady-state, the Euler equation for recruiters and employment dynamics holding in social planner’s problem
imply that
Sα	1−θ
θBC
= βS
α
C
(
1 + (1 −  σ) 	
1−θ − (1 −  θ) B	
θB
)
(A.1)
V =
(
σL
B(1 −  L)1−θ
) 1
θ
(A.2)
Straightforward algebra reveals that (A.1) is equivalent to Eq. (15). As a consequence, recalling that 	  ≡  V (1 −  L)−1
and denoting by 	̂ the positive solution of (A.1), the equilibrium level of employment is obtained by combining 	̂
with (A.2) as conveyed by Eq. (14). Thereafter, the equilibrium levels of consumption and capital can be derived,
respectively, from the steady-state versions of Eqs. (8) and (10).
Proof  of  Proposition  2
On the one hand, in steady-state, the Euler equation for corporate investment and the capital accumulation path are
given by
pI =  β
(
αSα−1 + (1 +  pI ) (1 −  δ)
)
−  1 (B.1)
b(
(
R
A
A
B
B
C
C
C
F
F
F
F
F
G
G
G
G
G
H
H
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K  =  I  +  (1 −  δ)K  (B.2)
Since   ≡  K(L  −  V )−1, Eqs. (B.1) and (B.2) imply that
I  =  δ
(
αβS
(1 +  pI ) (1 −  β (1 −  δ))
) 1
1−α
(L  −  V ) (B.3)
On the other hand, the equilibrium Euler equation for recruiters and the steady-state wealth accumulation path can
e written as
(1 −  α) Sα
q
=  β
(
(1 −  α) Sα
(
1 + 1 −  σ
q
)
−  w
)
(B.4)
A = (1 +  r) A  +  wL  −  C  (B.5)
Considering the results in Eqs. (35) and (B.2) as well as the market-clearing condition for assets in Eq. (32), Eq.
B.5) implies that
C  = I (1 −  β)
βδ
+ wL  (B.6)
Moreover, taking into account the definitions of   and q and the result in Eq. (B.2), Eq. (B.4)) leads to
w  = (1 −  α) S
(
I
δ (L −  V )
)α⎛⎜⎝1 − 1 −  β (1 −  σ)
B
(
V
1−L
)θ
β
⎞⎟⎠ (B.7)
Plugging the results in Eqs. (B.3), (B.6) and (B.7) into the market-clearing condition for the goods market in Eq.
33) taking into account the result in Eq. (A.2) allows to derive the hyperbolic expression in Eq. (37).
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